Stephen C. Phillips
Ph.D. Candidate, University of Florida
Stephen's conducts research in the field of American political development. His research agenda is motivated by an interest in institutional and ideational development, parties in government, legislative behavior, and political strategy. Stephen focuses on qualitative research, with inquiries heavily influenced by constitutional law, history, philosophy, and political science.
"I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions... But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors."
Thomas Jefferson (1816)
Stephen's dissertation examines the link between American constitutional development and equality under the law. A well-established body of interdisciplinary research focuses on the relationship between periodicity and civil rights, and a largely separate literature expounds the effects of constitutions on political development. Despite their connection, few attempts have been made in political science to link these topics and investigate how American constitutional development shapes our shared understanding of equality under the law and vice versa. Using process-tracing and causal modeling, I examine the policy processes surrounding the consideration of six statutes and constitutional amendments, during the Reconstruction, Progressive, and Equality eras. Specifically, I analyze how public and private actors utilize constitutional and political mechanisms and strategies to pursue reconstitutions of equality politics.
Philadelphia Reconsidered: Heresthetic and Legislative Design
Stephen C. Phillips, Alex P. Smith, and Peter R. Licari
Political scientists recognize that heresthetic is frequently used in contemporary politics, yet often ignore their use in the Founding Era. This study applies William Riker’s heresthetic model to the Constitutional Convention. Riker began the study of heresthetic by examining Gouverneur Morris’ role in adopting the Electoral College and vote-trading on the issues of slavery and navigation acts. Yet Riker did not examine the role of heresthetic in what he identifies as the most significant debate of the Convention: representation in Congress. Utilizing heresthetic tactics, small-state nationalists such as Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut overcame James Madison’s agenda-setting Virginia Plan, shaping a proposal capable of being approved at the Convention and ratified by the states. We examine the debate over representation. We argue tactics, including agenda stenting after the failure of the New Jersey Plan and participant curation with the Gerry Committee, were essential in maintaining unity amongst the states during the Founding Era. Furthermore, we contend that the Constitution is the product of many “fathers,” rather than the creation of one or two key delegates.
Ways and Means: Teaching Heresthetic by Simulating the Budget Process
Alex P. Smith and Stephen C. Phillips | Download
William Riker argued political skills and strategies can be developed through two methods: instruction or practice. Simulations offer opportunities for students to receive instruction in political strategies and practice developing political skills without the real-world consequences faced by policymakers. Budget simulations introduce students to collective action problems prevalent at all levels of American government. While developing and passing a budget provides students with practice, carefully constructing the simulation introduces the heresthetic tactics of agenda setting, strategic voting, and dimension manipulation. By incorporating these strategies into the simulation, students must navigate conflicting interests—maximize personal gains and risk not adopting a budget, or cooperate and approve a budget that may not align with personal preferences. When used in American government and political institution courses, the budget simulation helps students identify choices policymakers encounter and develop the skills necessary for navigating those situations and the broader policymaking process.
Partisanship at Water's Edge: Aplpying the Two-Presidency Thesis to Procedural Votes
Stephen C. Phillips
Previous research on presidential action in the legislative arena focuses almost exclusively on final passage roll call votes, not procedural votes. Rationalist literature holds presidents are more likely to take action when the costs are minimal and the benefits high. Taking a stand on a procedural vote is often characterized by low cost and high potential benefit. While political capital may be expended, the president can influence the agenda, attempt to prevent floor action, or use his or her support to craft a legislative coalition suitable to his or her own position. Wildavsky, and McCormick and Wittkopf, posit the president is more successful in areas of foreign policy, and specifically when foreign affairs are salient. Scholarship also demonstrates presidential popularity and polarization are significant elements in executive success. Through an analysis of cloture motions between 1959 and 2017, I examine presidential success on procedural votes. Specifically, I analyze the difference between success on foreign and domestic policy and nominations.